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MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Plans

SUBJECT: Summary of Critiques made by Military Officers
Attending the Special Indoctrination Course
Presented by Office of Training

1. In view of your personal interest and participation in the special indoctrination course for military personnel presented by the Office of Training in the period 6 to 17 December, I presume you will be interested in knowing how the officers attending evaluated the course.

2. All attending were invited to make constructive critiques, and prepared critique sheets were issued to them for this purpose. A total of sixteen officers made critiques, twelve of them signing their critique sheets; the remaining four turning theirs in unsigned. Since these officers were present in a guest status, they were invited to turn in critiques unsigned if they desired.

3. Of the sixteen making critiques, two were by Joint Staff officers; three by U.S. Army officers; six by officers sent by the U.S. Navy (one of these being an Air Force officer detailed from the Armed Forces Staff College, which is under Naval administration); one was submitted by a U.S. Air Force officer detailed by the Department; and the remaining four were anonymous.

4. There was complete unanimity of conviction that the course had accomplished its stated objective (to provide military staff officers with an appreciation of the capabilities, limitations and problems related to the employment of resistance forces in support of military operations); and that those attending had gained enough from the course to work with a CIA "opposite number" on a more knowledgeable basis. Weaknesses cited by some included "negative approach to resistance problems"; too much detail the first week, especially tradecraft (six hours of specially prepared coverage were given to furnish in part an appreciation of the limitations of capabilities of clandestine forces); and suggestions that the two weeks could profitably be reduced to one. Two Army officers suggested that as officers attending already are familiar with NSC directives imposing responsibilities on CIA for planning and conducting clandestine operations, much of the references to them could be eliminated to save time. One weakness criticized was the frank advice given during the course that on some of the points discussed there is no official doctrine or policy.

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5. There was nearly unanimity of opinion that the service War Colleges, and service schools down to the command and staff college levels need some time devoted to instruction on the existence of the "Fourth Force", and on the problems of coordinating operations at the planning staff levels that will be involved both for war planning now and for operational planning during a war. There was mixture of feeling as to whether this should be presented by CIA representatives alone, or by teams of CIA and military service unconventional forces. In all cases, it was felt the colleges should not try to undertake this instruction with their own staffs.

6. All who expressed an opinion on the question stated that this indoctrination should be continued for officers chosen on a strict "need to know" basis.

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Director of Training

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